June 18, 2013

Mail Bag: Cost of Equity in the Capital Asset Pricing Model

Eight months ago, a comment was left on a post that I never saw.  It was also left without a Disqus profile, meaning no email notification to the original poster.  It was such a good question, that I thought it deserved and answer and I am putting it here, as a mailbag, in the hopes he sees it.

Hi Joshua,

Mail Bag Question for Joshua KennonI know that feeling of having so much to do you don’t even want to start. Sometimes it helps me to choose one thing and make it a point to have it done by the end of the day. Of course I make sure it’s an important task or project.

I wanted to ask you a question about valuation. I’ve read that you think beta is worthless, so it’s reasonable to assume you don’t use CAPM either. How do you establish the cost of equity or required return then? Do you use your experience and judgement?

Mario

Before I get to the cost of equity under the CAPM, let me explain how I approach the task of valuing an asset.

When I calculate intrinsic value for anything – people too often think of stocks, but it is true for everything from an apartment building to a car dealership – I look at the adjusted net cash flows (e.g., backing out weird depreciation things if there are some unusual situations, analyzing inventory levels, such as if there is some sort of artificially low inventory cost basis that is inflating profits that can’t be maintained in the future, etc.), and then discount those cash flows back to the present.  Things like cost of debt capital are very important because they influence that net cash flow figure – if you could buy a business paying 10% on its liabilities and use your financial strength to get that down to 4%, you can pay a higher price because you can instantly make intrinsic value higher than it is for other investors.

As for the discount rate, I tend to use the risk-free Treasury plus a modification for inflation. That way, everything is discounted at the same rate. That may sound odd at first, but it serves as a conservative check against human nature: Too often, investors will compensate for not being able to accurately project cash flows in high risk situations by substituting an arbitrarily high discount rate. While it can make sense in certain situations (e.g., a private equity investment in a Silicon Valley startup), it provides a false sense of security in many situations. If I can’t project the cash flows, it forces me to accept that I am speculating, not investing.  If I am not comfortable discounting at the lower rate, I throw the potential holding off the pile and move on to something else.  If I wanted excitement, I’d go to Vegas.  I want to get richer.

That way, all potential investments – stocks, bonds, real estate, expansion at the private businesses, or anything else that generates cash – are ranked against each other. I’ve said it elsewhere on the site, but if we were suddenly in a situation where stocks were highly unattractive, and I were offered the local McDonald’s franchises at a rate 2x higher than any other alternative use of cash, and that it beat inflation and taxes handily in my analysis, I’d acquire it.  I’d be sitting here with a McDonald’s cap on and, probably given my personality, be serving coffee to customers when I felt like getting out of the office because I love seeing businesses work.

In other words, I value things, look down the list, and if something is attractive, it gets bought.  My selection is colored by my personality, as are all portfolios; I prefer businesses that grow themselves and never need to be sold.  Give me one of those at an attractive price and I am a happy, happy man.

McDonalds Franchise Investment

If we were to wake up in a world were McDonald’s franchises were offering 2x the return of stocks, bonds, real estate, and other holdings, and it still beat inflation and taxes, providing large real gains in purchasing power, that is what I would own.  I am interested in cash.  I want cash flowing into the bank, from all over the country, and even the world, constantly throughout the year, without me having to sell my time for it.  The cost of equity, as calculated under the CAPM, does nothing to help me achieve that end.

This approach lets me use an apples-to-apples comparison.  It treats $1 of net cash as $1 of net cash, regardless of if it comes from a sewage treatment plant or an exciting technology project.  It also makes me explicitly acknowledge errors in my model when and if they occur, causing it to get better over time.  

That said, to your question: The cost of equity capital under the CAPM model.  It is idiotic.  Completely and totally idiotic.  If I buy a storage unit business, and hold it directly through a limited liability company, there is no quoted market fluctuation in the asset.  The discounted cash flow analysis would not change.  Were I to suddenly issue shares, and have a quoted market for them, underlying reality for the business is no different, so the net present value remains the same but the CAPM model introduces a valuation variable based on what those shares do as some sort of imperfect proxy for the performance of the underlying business and perceptions of outside investors.  How wildly the stock price fluctuates has no influence on how much cash I can take from the properties as the control investor.  

It has no value to what I consider important: It’s the cash that matters.  I want to buy the most cash, at the lowest price, adjusting for growth and factoring in inflation and taxes.  CAPM’s cost of equity formula does nothing to help me achieve that end because the inclusion of the beta variable as a component is effectively meaningless.  It can be measured, but it doesn’t tell you much about what counts: How much cash, can I, as the control investor, take out of the enterprise?

Other than stock options, I have never used Beta, one of the components of calculating the cost of equity under CAPM, to make a single investing decision.  It implicitly presumes that other people are acting rationally and solely in terms of the prospects of the underlying security, which is not always the case.  In some situations, people are forced to sell (e.g., the non-economic selling of 2009) to raise liquidity, even though they know the assets they held are cheap.  Do you think people wanted to get rid of their American Express stock so that it was trading at $10 per share?  Or their Wells Fargo so that it was below $10 per share?  Sure, there were some panic sellers in there, but a lot of institutions were raising money because scared investors were forcing redemption or cash needed to be raised for emergency management.  These managers had no choice.  The CAPM can’t use human judgment because it doesn’t factor in those extenuating circumstances.

Formulas are good, but over reliance on models has now created three major capital market collapses in the past 30 years.  You cannot stop thinking and using your judgment.  In my opinion, the cost of equity under CAPM does just that.  It makes no sense.

(As a side note: Sometimes, the term “cost of equity” is used to describe another calculation outside of the capital asset pricing model.  It involves taking the dividends per share and dividing by the current market value of the stock, then summing the result with the growth rate of the dividends per share.  The purpose is to show you the theoretical return investors are demanding for owning a business at any given time.  It can be interesting to use.  I have no qualms with that metric.)

  • Mario

    Hi Joshua,

    I wrote this question, so thank you so much for answering. I’ll be posting with a Disqus profile from now on.

    What you’re saying makes a lot of sense. The emotions causing other investors to buy and sell doesn’t change the nature of the future cash flows. If everyone was acting rationally, then the efficient market hypothesis could be true and thus beta, but that’s not the case. People buy and sell for many different reasons, including those that have nothing to do with the asset itself.

    Also, instead of trying to somehow include risk in the discount rate, it makes sense to assess risk in how confident you are with the cash flow projections. If I don’t understand the business enough to be confident in my assessment of the future, then I probably shouldn’t be investing in it in the first place.

    This is a game changer. As a college student majoring in Finance, it helps me a lot to see how you approach things as opposed to how modern theory says we should.

    Thank you so much!
    Mario Garza

  • Frankie

    Joshua,

    I appreciate the point of view you bring to your writings. So thank you for that.

    I am getting hung up on the discount rate. If we are using current 30 year bond yield (3.18%) adjusted for current inflation (1.76%) we get a discount rate of 5%. That seems awfully low. I understand that having a margin of safety will protect you from an intrinsic value that you were too optimistic about, but I think this method is inviting artificial inflation of intrinsic value calculations.

    My first thought was to use both the median inflation rate (2.35%) and the median 30 year bond yield (5.82%). This would give us a discount rate of 8.3%. I would adjust those numbers up if the current inflation rate was higher than 2.35% and if the 30 year bond yield was higher than the 5.82% in order to correctly reflect the current opportunity costs. This is a discount rate that I would have more comfort in, but I only have comfort with that rate because it is more in line with what I was taught.

    Would you be able to go into more depth about the discount rate. Also, where do you see any potential pitfalls in my line of thinking?

    Thank you,
    Frankie

    • http://www.joshuakennon.com/ Joshua Kennon

      You are thinking along the correct lines.

      Adjusting for the historically low bond yields, which are artificially inflating asset prices, I tend to be of the school that the correct discount rate should be somewhere around 6% to 8%.

      Calculate the fair value then look for assets that are really attractive and trading at a substantial discount to that figure – as I’ve said elsewhere, I hardly ever break out a spreadsheet or actually do a detailed calculation because I look for the Benjamin Graham “fat man” test – and things tend to work out in the long-run. But then again, I’ve been doing this for a long time and can spot when I think things like pension assumptions are too optimistic or management is doing something screwy with the accounting that is making the accruals too high relative to cash flows. So the figure I discount are not always the same as the net earnings per share you see published in the annual report.

      Looking at the stock market currently, there aren’t that many attractive stocks. I’ve talked about Brown Forman in the past; it’s a fantastic company that is everything you can ever imagine, but it is in the realm of “only fools tread here”. I think that is going to depress the returns of an equity holder buying in at these prices. Perhaps I’m wrong and my projections are too pessimistic but better safe than sorry.

      On the other hand, there are two industries that are, generally speaking, dirt cheap. In fact, some of the most famous businesses in the world are at really attractive valuations and people are just letting them sit there in plain site because they are comparing the stocks to the lows of 2009 and not to the intrinsic value itself.

      But most of the numbers I run … with the economy the way it is, the national deficit figures the way they are, etc., I think most blue chip, high quality stocks should be trading at 12x earnings, not 22x earnings. I also think dividend yields should be up to 4% to 5% on average. It’s the Federal Reserve’s stimulus policies that are preventing it, in my opinion. The goal is to give consumers and businesses more time to repair their personal balance sheets by repaying debt. Lower interest rates means more principal repaid. That’s the theory, anyway, to grossly oversimplify it.

      • Frankie

        This helps me out a lot. Thank you.

        I agree with not using reported EPS like you said. I have been trying to wrap my head around the intricacies of Buffett’s Owner Earnings for my DCF analysis. I do understand accounting enough to get by, but I am working towards having what you describe as a “testable fluency in the basics.” Only with practice and patience will I move in that direction. I would like to get to the point where I can recognize a pass/fail on the “fat man” test. As of now, I don’t have the fundamentals down nearly enough to spot one. I learn best when I can dive into the numbers and test out assumptions, so that is why my questions are usually geared towards the details.

        And to take a guess at your two industry picks, the first would be Financials, but the second would be Tech, but I feel like that isn’t where you normally invest.